TEHRAN – In Gaza, the Israeli regime’s systematic targeting of security agencies is an attempt to achieve several objectives, foremost among them portraying the coastal enclave as a lawless region where no authority exists.

During the past seven months of relative calm in Gaza, scores of people have been killed and injured as a result of successive Israeli assassination operations. These attacks specifically targeted first- and second-tier leaders within the Palestinian resistance forces.

Among them were Ezzedine al-Haddad and Mohammed Awda, chiefs of staff of the Qassam Brigades in the Strip, along with other commanders handling sensitive, highly complex, and critical files.

Among the resistance forces that suffered the heaviest blows during this period were those tasked with maintaining security and stability in the small, devastated enclave. These included both government security agencies and their counterparts within the resistance movement’s security structures, which play a decisive security and intelligence role in Gaza, particularly since the outbreak of the genocidal war in October 2023.

Since the beginning of the Gaza genocide, Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) have deliberately targeted all government police and security agencies, destroying their centers and capabilities. It has also pursued and assassinated their commanders and officials of all ranks and positions.

Thousands of officers and personnel from these agencies have been killed or wounded, creating an unprecedented security vacuum that led to disastrous consequences, including widespread theft, rising crime rates, and a significant increase in killings linked to family disputes.

Despite the tremendous efforts made by these agencies to address the severe disruption caused by the IOF aggression and their persistent attempts to reorganize themselves using younger personnel within their ranks, the ferocity and relentless nature of the Zionist campaign prevented them from implementing most of the emergency plans they sought to implement during the genocidal war.

After several critical months of security vacuum, Palestinian resistance forces sought to compensate for part of the gap created by the paralysis of police and security institutions. They assigned selected members, particularly those affiliated with their security units, to undertake these duties. These individuals possessed extensive experience in community security, protecting the home front, confronting collaborators working with the IOF, tracking them, and thwarting their plots and schemes.

Although these units were also targeted by the IOF, much like the government’s police and security agencies, they proved more capable of absorbing the impact and minimizing the consequences. This was due to their decentralized structure, lack of exposure to the IOF by limiting the use of identifiable vehicles and equipment, and the concealment of the identities of personnel working in this sensitive field.

About five months after the genocidal war started, the resistance movement’s security agencies, together with some government institutions that had regained part of their operational capacity, succeeded in significantly restoring domestic security in Gaza. While conditions did not return to pre-genocide levels, they improved considerably compared to the situation that prevailed immediately after the outbreak of the genocide, especially during its first four months.

Over the past two months, the IOF intensified its targeting of the resistance front’s security agencies after apparently obtaining intelligence about some of their senior leaders. Government security institutions, which had managed to restore some of their facilities during the current truce, were also affected. The IOF targeted these facilities and centers, killing those inside, including civilian visitors and inmates.

Within the resistance movement’s security and intelligence agencies, many active leaders were targeted either through direct assassinations by fighter jets and surveillance drones or through traitorous militants that carried out several assassination operations, most of them concentrated in the central governorate and Khan Younis. These attacks targeted senior security officials with extensive experience in security and counterintelligence work, while another set of IOF operations aimed at senior resistance security officials failed.

Several days ago, IOF warplanes bombed several residential apartments in four different areas of Gaza City, causing many casualties among men, women, and children. Those killed included senior leaders within Hamas’s General Security Service, widely regarded as the central security institution operating inside Gaza.

These systematic attacks against the Palestinian resistance movement’s security agencies and government security institutions serve several objectives.

Chief among them is portraying Gaza as a territory beyond the rule of law, where chaos is the prevailing norm, a dangerous place for anyone inside, and that the international community must support any security or political body other than the Palestinian resistance movement to restore order.

This is pursued through several methods, including spreading rumors and false news built on distortions and exaggerated figures, particularly regarding the scale of lawlessness and levels of social violence. While such problems cannot be entirely denied, they are portrayed as far more severe than they actually are by the Israeli regime’s narratives and their agents.

Another policy by the Zionist regime to reinforce this narrative is fueling family disputes, which have reportedly become a notable aspect of daily life in Gaza. Through collaborators and social media, the occupying regime instills hatred among citizens and promotes divisions between residents and displaced people, rich and poor, and between those who own homes, partial homes, tents, or makeshift shelters.

These comparisons, which the occupying regime is seeking to transform into a broader social culture, have become a major factor behind many disputes. They are frequently linked to killings and thefts that have reportedly increased in recent months, as most of Gaza’s population suffers from poverty, destitution, and limited means due to the suffocating Israeli blockade.

At this point, security authorities in Gaza reportedly concluded that the IOF facilitates many family conflicts by supplying weapons to some combatants through collaborators. In other cases, security forces rushing to break up clashes, especially armed confrontations, have themselves been targeted. This pattern has become increasingly noticeable whenever disputes occur. The IOF also uses social media platforms to incite sedition through anonymous and unverified pages.

A second objective pursued by the occupying regime is preparing the ground for a larger role for collaborating militias. Much of the information circulating indicates these groups could play a broader role than the one assigned to them since their formation. This primarily involves controlling larger areas of Gaza, whether within the so-called “yellow zone,” where these militias are currently concentrated, or in areas adjacent to the “yellow line”.

Over the past three weeks, the IOF has expanded its occupation in these areas to unprecedented levels, in some cases extending seven kilometers westward in Khan Younis and approximately three and a half kilometers in Gaza City. 

These reports are reinforced by newly established IOF sites near the so-called “yellow line”, occupied exclusively by members of these proxy militias. These sites are being used as launching points for aggression aimed at cutting off Salah al-Din Road, Gaza’s most important transportation route, and abducting civilians traveling to and from Gaza City. They have also been used to launch attacks on nearby areas, as recently occurred south of the Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza City.

From the occupying regime’s perspective, the Palestinian resistance movement’s security agencies represent the core obstacle to such activities. Experience has shown that these agencies are capable of confronting the expansion of militias, limiting their influence, and acting forcefully against them.

Consequently, weakening these agencies, dismantling their organizational structures, and disrupting their operational balance, particularly through the targeting of senior leaders, has become an urgent priority.

The Zionist regime may have additional objectives behind its systematic and continuous targeting of security institutions.

These include spreading fear and despair among Gaza’s population and creating the impression that the forces that once protected and defended them have disappeared or, at the very least, lost much of their effectiveness. This narrative has appeared in Israeli social media posts and is backed up by the Zionist regime’s officials who openly speak about mass emigration from Gaza at a certain stage.

Nevertheless, contrary to what Israel is seeking, the resistance’s movement security agencies, together with government security institutions, continue to maintain a notable degree of control. Despite the losses suffered, they remain cohesive and resilient, carrying out their assigned duties with determination and effectiveness. 

They understand that their collapse would constitute a devastating blow to the broader Palestinian resistance project in Gaza and to community security, which is considered a fundamental pillar of continued resilience in the face of the ongoing genocide.

Palestinian resistance forces also believe that the sacrifices made by their leaders, personnel, and members will one day contribute to ending the occupation regime’s presence in historic Palestine. They also know that this day is very near, needing only more patience.